The Battle of Cambrai – 20th November 1917
By mid-1917, there was a growing school of thought amongst the Army hierarchy that the development of the tank should be halted, even abandoned because of previous perceived ‘failures’ on the battlefields of France. These so called ‘failures’ could have been attributed to the way that GHQ was repeatedly choosing to employ the tanks at the time, where in the main ‘penny packeting’ and deploying the tanks on appalling ground with swamp-like conditions meant that many where bogged-in or broken down well before reaching their assault positions.
Sgt J C Allnatt, serving as a tank driver prior to the Battle of Cambrai was recorded at the time making the following comments; “It was unfortunate that the decision to send tanks rested with the Officers in high places, if these Officers had been to see the salient, and if they had had the brains of a child, they surely would not have committed the tank crews to practically certain death. Every member of the Tank Corps, even those of the lowest rank, knew that they should not be there. Even the Commanders of the British Army, from the comfort and security of GHQ, should have known an attack should never have been made where the terrain is bad. There were plenty of places where the tanks could have been used and were afterwards with great success”
It was now clear that, unless the Tank Corps were given a chance to realise its full potential, the Corps could cease to exist; its expansion had already been put on hold.
Fortunately, it was decided that the tanks would get their chance, a plan was devised, a tank ‘Raid’ in the relatively undamaged open rolling countryside just south of the village of Cambrai. The plan was altered many times, eventually evolving into a much larger scale operation that involved the taking of many villages, strongly defended and integral to the Hindenburg Line.